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conditions. Surely, if the courts may declare a restriction wholly unenforceable, they
may do so in part.
While there are no precise rules to govern the courts in cases involving changed
conditions, certain of the above mentioned factors appear to have been accorded
greater wight. The size of the tract, and the location of the change in relation to the
restricted area seem to be more important than the other factors. California, in Wolff v.
Fallon, has expressed a liberal view of these two considerations. The tract was large,
the whole tract was not affected by the changed conditions, and only four minor
violations occurred within the tract, and yet the court granted affirmative relief.
It may be that the expansion of California in the past decade was a silent factor
in arriving at this view. Undoubtedly as business reaches into areas so recently con-
verted to housing a rapidly growing population, the battleground for these conflicting
interests will be the courts of California.
These courts must, in times of such rapid change, remain sensitive to the problems
arising from this change if they are to serve those who seek their help.
Donald C. Thuesen.
PARTNERSHIP: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PARTNER AS EMPLOYEE.-Can a
partner be an employee of the partnership of which he is a member?
The First Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana in Trappey v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co.,' an action by an injured partner against the firm's insurance
carrier, held that a partner could be an employee within the scope of the Workmen's
Compensation Law and overruled the defendant's exception of no right or cause of
action, a decision in conflict with prior Louisiana decisions2 and with the prevailing
view in the United States.3
The overwhelming weight of authority in both the United States and England
that a partner may not be an employee of the firm4 stems from the common law
concept of a partnership as an aggregate of individuals which has no entity nor
identity separate from that of the individuals comprising it.5 In effect the use of a
partnership name was only a shorthand method of designating the individuals
referred to. Under this view it would follow that the partners as individuals were the
employers of anyone who worked for the firm under a contract of hire. Hence the
difficulty-if a partner claimed employee status, he was his own employer.
In the English case of Ellis v. Ellis,6 dealing with a claim by a partner, the court
stated that the Workmen's Compensation Act
"... clearly contemplates a relation between two opposite parties, one of whom is
employer and the other employee .... It seems to me obvious that a person cannot for
the purposes of the Act occupy the position of being both employer and employee."
Up to the time of the Trappey decision courts in almost every state of the United
States approved the Ellis v. Ellis view except where statutes expressly covered partners.
Oklahoma stood alone in the contrary contention.
1 77 So.2d 183 (La.App. 1954).
'Dezendorf v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 160 (LaApp. 1936) ; Harper v. Ragus, 62 So.2d 167
(La.App. 1952).
158 Ai. Jua., Workmen's Compensation § 146 (1948).
'CRANE, PARTNersui', 288 (2d ed. 1952).
rId. at 12.
6 [1905] 1 KB 324.
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The Oklahoma view is based on a literal interpretation of the workmen's com-
pensation statute. Since the definition of employer expressly includes a partnership
and the definition of an employee as "any person engaged in work in employment
of any person, firm or corporation carrying on a business covered by the terms of
the act" does not expressly exclude a partner, it is held that a partner can be an
employee of a partnership of which he is a member within the meaning of the act.
7
After judicial decision had excluded such partners from coverage, the California
legislature amended the Workmen's Compensation Act to expressly include as
employees working partners who received a stated wage independent of their share of
profits.8 Washington, Nevada and Michigan laws also include such express coverage.9
Such was the state of the law at the time the First Circuit Court of Appeal of
Louisiana was called upon to decide the Trappey case. In addition to the almost
unanimous holdings in other jurisdictions, two Louisiana cases decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal had followed the majority rule.10 How, then, did the court
reach the opposite decision in this case?
The reasoning of the court turns upon the Louisiana civil law doctrine that a
commercial partnership is "a moral being, distinct from the persons who compose
it . . . a civil person. . "."."11 Logical deductions from this concept of a partnership
led to the conclusion that this partnership, acting as an entity, could and did hire
the plaintiff as an employee. The partnership, then, was liable to the plaintiff under
the Workmen's Compensation Act for injury incurred in the course of his employment.
The opinion is well argued and amply supported with citations regarding the
prevailing view in the United States and the Louisiana entity theory of partnerships.
Judge Ellis, writing the majority opinion of the court, quotes at length from F.
Hodge O'Neal's article entitled An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership,
(Part 11)12 to summarize both the common law aggregate theory of partnerships and
the Louisiana civil law entity theory.
Regarding the Louisiana view, the court quotes Dean O'Neal:
"Louisiana courts have shown remarkable unanimity in their comments on the nature
of the partnership. They might have been expected to encounter considerable difficulty
in maintaining a consistent theory. . . .Further, in view of the tendency of Louisiana
courts in most phases of partnership law to import Anglo-American concepts, it would not
have been surprising to find the Louisiana courts at times borrowing entity ideas and on
other occasions adopting aggregate theories. Such has not been the fact. Louisiana courts
consistently have asserted that both the commercial partnership and the ordinary part-
nership are legal persons."'1
It is interesting, however, that after analyzing several types of cases, Dean
O'Neal concludes:
"The conclusion seems unavoidable that Louisiana's entity theory has not resulted in
practices which differentiate Louisiana law from law in other states. .-. . In most situations
where the Louisiana courts utilize the entity theory to explain their conclusions, under-
lying practices in Louisiana do not differ from practices prevailing in aggregate juris-
dictions. Further, an analysis of the cases in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions shows that
the courts often use the entity or aggregate concepts as a convenient rationalization for
conclusions actually predicated on other grounds. That many courts are beginning to
Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 86 Okla. 139, 207 Pac. 314 (1922).
'27 CAL. JUR., Workmen's Compensation § 23 (1926).
'CRANE, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 289, n. 84.
0 See note 2 supra.
11 Smith v. McMichen, 3 La.Ann. 319 (1848).
'2 9 LA. L. REv. 450 (1949).
I' Id. at 453.
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realize that neither theory furnishes an adequate premise from which to deduce rules to
fit all problems is demonstrated by their departure from the prevailing theory whenever an
occasion seems to demand. If partnership practice in Louisiana differs'materially from
practice in other states, those differences cannot be attributed to the Louisiana courts
adherence to the entity view."14 (Emphasis added.)
Was the court in the Trappey case reluctantly carrying the entity theory to its
logical extreme, or was it instead using it as a "convenient rationalization for
conclusions actually predicated on other grounds"?
It is agreed that the Uniform Partnership Act has adopted entity concepts in
some respects though not explicitly avowing the entity theory. 15
The tendency to personify the partnership under the Uniform Partnership Act
for the purpose of holding the spouse of a partner to be within the protection of the
Workmen's Compensation Acts is shown in Keegan v. Keegan"
6 and Felice v. Felice.17
In the latter case the court states that "under the present state of the law the
Workmen's Compensation Act has personified the partnership . . . for purposes of
accomplishing the beneficent social intention of the Legislature" and that the contract
of hire of the spouse of the partner was with that "jural person and not with her
husband individually."
Professor Crane comments regarding partnerships: "As in the case of the
corporation, the entity may be recognized or disregarded according to the demands
of justice in the particular situation."' 8 Such a discretionary approach regarding
corporations is indicated in the treatment of Workmen's Compensation cases regarding
coverage of corporate officers, stockholders, and directors nominally in the employ
of the corporation. Instead of automatic coverage of these individuals since the
corporation is a legal entity, recovery under the compensation laws depends upon
the nature of the work performed, percentage of ownership of stock, and whether work
of an employee nature is merely occasional or incidental, or is part of the regular
work of the individual involved.' 9
As an example, in Skouitchi v. Chic Cloak and Suit Co. 2 0 the president of a
corporation, owning 12% of the stock and having no substantial operating duties
as president, was employed as manager in which capacity he performed duties of a
typical employee. The New York court held he was entitled to compensation for
injury in the course of his managerial duties since "a corporation is a complete
entity, separate and distinguishable from its stockholders and officers" and this entity
was his employer.
On the other hand, in Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co. 21 the president of a corporation
was denied compensation coverage. The plaintiff was the majority stockholder, drawing
a salary of $70.00 per week which was uninterrupted by the accident. The court
said: "Theoretically, he was subject to the orders of his corporation and was liable
to be discharged for disobedience. Practically, he was the corporation and only by a
legal fiction its servant in any sense."
Similarly, in Leigh Aitchinson, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n.,22 the principal stock-
holder, owning 127 of 130 shares of outstanding capital stock, was denied compen-
"9 LA. L. Rv. 472 (1949).
" CRANE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 19.
" 194 Minn. 261, 260 N.W. 318 (1935).
1" 112 A.2d 581 (N.J. Superior Ct., 1955).
's CRANE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 17.
1958 Am. JuR., Workmen's Compensation § 150 (1948).
20 230 N.Y. 296, 130 N.E. 299 (1921).
21221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364 (1917).
-" 188 Wis. 218, 205 N.W. 806 (1925).
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sation for injuries. It was shown that he fixed his own salary and was subject to the
direction of no one; the court accordingly held that he was not an employee of the
corporation, citing Bowne v. Bowne, supra.
Clearly these decisions do not turn upon the legal entity of the corporation but
on the actual existence of the requisites of the Master-Servant relationship, such as
right of control of hours and of manner of doing work. If these requisites are lacking,
the entity of the corporation as employer is disregarded.
Consider the results if the same tests be applied to the partnership situation.
In Trappey v. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. the plaintiff had been employed by the
Trappey Beverage Co., a partnership, in the capacity of manager and supervisor
of its bottling plant. Some time later, he was given a 1/6 interest in the partnership.
After the creation of this interest he was injured in the course of his duties as manager.
Is it not conceivable in this factual situation that the plaintiff retained his
employee status in that he remained subject to the direction and control of the
partners acting as a group and subject to discharge by them? In business practice
such a fact situation is common. If a 12% stockholder may be an employee of the
corporation as in the Skouitchi case supra, why should not a partner with a 1 6 3/ %
interest be an employee of the partnership when doing comparable work?
It is argued in Le Clear v. Smith23 that
"there is little room for doubt but that in certain aspects a copartnership is a legal
entity, and it may be regarded as such, particularly here, where the effort of the Work-
men's Compensation Law is to cast upon the business of the employer the burden of
compensation for injuries growing out of such business. But though an entity, it had not
as such the capacity as an artifice to hire, discharge, and direct its employees. That power
rested in the copartners, or in some person authorized by them. As pointed out in
Bowne v. Bowne Co. . . . the claimant should not be considered an employee because he
was the corporation. So here we are led to hold that Le Clear cannot be regarded as an
employee, because he was a member of the partnership."
It is submitted that a corporation has no more capacity as an artificial being to
hire, discharge or direct its employees than a partnership. Such power rests in its
board of directors or some person authorized by them. If the law can conceive of a
corporate officer or director who is also an employee, why not a partner who is also
an employee, if the facts meet the requisites for coverage in other respects? In view
of present business practice and broadening concepts in the partnership law, isn't
it as unrealistic to hold that as a matter of law Trappey could not be an employee
since each partner is the employer, as it would have been to hold in the Bowne case
that the plaintiff president and majority stockholder was as a matter of law an
employee because the corporation was a legal entity, though for all practical purposes
he was the corporation?
In the Trappey case the court states that, though difficulties might arise as a
result of its holding, recognition of the possible employee status of a partner is
preferable to the English theory which controlled the prior Louisiana decisions24
cited to the court as precedents in Louisiana for the view that a partner could
not be an employee.
It should be noted, however, that Judge Cavanaugh concurred in the decision
on the ground that the claim was against the insurance carrier whose policy listed
the plaintiff as an employee. While declining to accept the entity of the partnership as
employer he felt the insurer should be bound by its contract.
It would seem that the Louisiana court has taken a step forward in giving judicial
" 207 New York A.D. 617, 202 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1923).
24 See note 2 supra.
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